On the Pricing of Step-Up Bonds in the European Telecom Sector by Lando, David & Mortensen, Allan
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   WP 2004-9 
 
On the Pricing of Step-Up Bonds in the 
European Telecom Sector 
 
by 
 
David Lando and Allan Mortensen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
INSTITUT FOR FINANSIERING, Handelshøjskolen i København 
Solbjerg Plads 3, 2000 Frederiksberg C 
tlf.: 38 15 36 15      fax: 38 15 36 00 
 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Copenhagen Business School 
Solbjerg Plads 3, DK - 2000 Frederiksberg C, Denmark 
Phone (+45)38153615, Fax (+45)38153600 
www.cbs.dk/departments/finance 
 
ISBN 87-90705-88-2 
ISSN 0903-0352 
 
On the Pricing of Step-Up Bonds in the
European Telecom Sector∗
David Lando† Allan Mortensen‡
November 12, 2004
Abstract
This paper investigates the pricing of step-up bonds, i.e. corporate
bonds with provisions stating that the coupon payments increase as the
credit rating level of the issuer declines. To assess the risk-neutral rating
transition probabilities necessary to price these bonds, we introduce a new
calibration method within the reduced-form rating-based model of Jarrow,
Lando, and Turnbull (1997). We also treat split ratings and adjust for
rating outlook. Step-up bonds have been issued in large amounts in the
European telecom sector, and we ﬁnd that, through most of the sample,
step-up bonds issued by the two largest issuers have traded at a discount
relative to comparable ﬁxed-coupon bonds from the same issuers. Our
ﬁndings cannot be attributed to traditional liquidity factors, and they sug-
gest that issuing step-up bonds increased the cost of capital for the issuers.
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1 Introduction
The corporate bond market in the European telecommunication sector has in
recent years seen a dramatic increase in the number and volume of corporate
bond issues with embedded step-up covenants, i.e. provisions which link the cash
ﬂow of the bond to the credit rating of the issuer by increasing the coupons as
the rating declines. In this paper, we study the pricing of step-up bonds rela-
tive to comparable fixed-coupon bonds issued by the two largest issuers, Deutsche
Telekom and France Telecom. We ﬁnd evidence that the step-up bonds have
traded at a discount relative to ﬁxed-coupon debt through most of the sam-
ple. This evidence is consistent with the idea that ’complicated’ securities may
have excess expected returns, possibly because of limited participation or higher
parameter uncertainty in the relevant pricing models. Such an explanation is
supported by the observation that the discount on the step-up bonds tends to
disappear as they approach maturity, and the uncertainty on the cash ﬂow, due
to the step-up feature, therefore vanishes.
The idea of linking credit quality to cash ﬂows is not new. Step-up bonds are a
special case of credit-sensitive notes, which were ﬁrst issued in the late 1980s, and
similar principles underlie credit-linked notes and credit triggers in swaps. What
is remarkable in the case of European telecom step-up bonds, however, is the
large volume of issuance – making the secondary market for these bonds highly
liquid. Despite the large liquidity of the bonds, a feeling among many market
participants, that we have talked to, is that the step-up bonds in the telecom
sector are often mispriced and typically underpriced.1 Our results conﬁrm this
observation, and we argue that the pricing diﬀerences cannot be attributed to
traditional liquidity factors. This is again consistent with the fact that bonds
which lose their step-up feature trade at prices similar to those with no step-up
provision. The conclusion is robust to a number of alternative speciﬁcations. This
robustness derives from the fact that our approach is a relative pricing exercise.
For example, the speciﬁcation of recovery rates or of riskless interest rates aﬀects
the two types of bond in approximately the same way, and therefore the relative
pricing is largely unaﬀected.
The underpricing of step-up bonds in the secondary market is interesting
since this type of bond has come to comprise a sizable part of the European
corporate bond market. Furthermore, our ﬁndings suggest that issuing step-up
bonds increased the cost of capital for the issuers, which is important since step-
1Two examples from investment bank notes include: ”The market does not appear to be
assigning speciﬁc value to the credit protection in each bond. It is our view that the credit
protection features have value, and that these issues are trading cheap to their market levels
when taking this into account” Lehman Brothers, Credit-sensitive Telecom Bonds (July 13,
2000), and ”... we continue to think the market is, in fact, undervaluing these [step-up] options
prior to imminent ratings actions ... they are essentially being oﬀered for free in various
outstanding securities” Deutsche Bank, European Credit Strategy (January 19, 2001).
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up bonds account for almost a quarter of total liabilities, at the end of 2002, for
the two companies we consider.
This raises the question of the rationale behind the issuance of corporate
bonds with step-up provisions. In practise, the provisions can be viewed as a
partial hedge against losses arising from downgrades. Investors may fear that
the market will react strongly to downgrades, possibly because fund managers
will have to abandon positions as the rating approaches speculative grade. From
a theoretical point of view, step-up bonds may reduce the agency costs of debt
identiﬁed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The step-up provisions can be seen as
a means for the management of the issuing company to signal that it will and can
comply with the target leverage ratios required by the rating agencies to retain
ratings above the step-up trigger level. From the perspective of bankruptcy costs
and tax beneﬁts from debt, however, step-up bonds seem ineﬃcient. Step-up
bonds have lower tax beneﬁts since the tax shields (the coupons) are high when
proﬁts are low, and as argued by Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2003) they
have higher bankruptcy costs than equivalent ﬁxed-coupon bonds due to what
is sometimes referred to as the credit-cliﬀ. The problem is that the liabilities of
the debtor increase when the credit quality of the debtor is already decreasing,
which tends to increase the probability of default. A potential credit-cliﬀ does
not aﬀect our conclusions, since we study the pricing of step-up bonds relative
to ﬁxed-coupon bonds of the same debtor, which should also reﬂect a potentially
increased default probability.
A natural framework for the pricing of rating-sensitive securities is the reduced-
form rating-based model introduced by Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997, JLT)
and Lando (1994), and carried forward for example in the works of Das and Tu-
fano (1996), Kijima and Komoribayashi (1998, KK), Lando (1998) and Arvanitis,
Gregory, and Laurent (1999). We implement the precise (and often complicated)
structure of the step-up provisions in the model of JLT, allowing for split ratings
and rating outlooks. In assessing the risk-neutral rating transition probabilities,
we propose a new calibration method which overcomes the numerical problems
with the method of JLT and is economically intuitive as opposed to the method
of KK. We illustrate that the choice of calibration method is critical for the non-
default entries of the implied rating transition matrix and therefore potentially
important for the pricing of rating-sensitive assets.
The pricing of credit-sensitive notes was ﬁrst studied by Ogden and Moon (1993)
without modelling the rating transitions. Das and Tufano (1996) priced credit-
sensitive notes in a model extending the setup of JLT to stochastic recovery
rates. They relied on the method of JLT in obtaining the risk-neutral rating
probabilities which is, as we shall see, not robust to large deviations between
empirical and implied default probabilities. Acharya, Das, and Sundaram (2002)
also priced credit-sensitive notes, also applying the JLT calibration method, but
they did not consider the market valuation of step-up bonds.
The pricing of step-up bonds in the JLT model has also been analyzed in a
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parallel study by Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2004b). This paper diﬀers in
several respects. Firstly, the focus of that paper is a comparison of three diﬀerent
step-up valuation models, whereas our focus is to what extent step-up bonds have
been priced at a discount relative to ﬁxed-coupon bonds. Secondly, they apply the
calibration method of KK, and they do not implement the full details of the step-
up provisions. We propose a more intuitive calibration method, and we address
the complications of split ratings and rating outlook. Thirdly, we study a larger
group of bonds and a much longer sample period, including the more interesting
period where step-up triggers have been activated. The value of step-up clauses
has also been estimated in a few investment banks notes. The ones we are aware
of, however, apply either subjective or historical rating transition probabilities
and do not give quantitative statements regarding the market valuation of step-up
bonds through time.
In an empirical study on European telecom corporate bonds, Newman and
Rierson (2003) ﬁnd downward-sloping demand curves, i.e. credit spreads are
positively related to aggregate industry-wide debt issuance. This applies to all
issues of the companies and thus does not aﬀect our relative pricing analysis.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the market
for step-up bonds and the precise language of the provisions. Furthermore, we
present our data and make the ﬁrst crude assessment of the market values at-
tached to the provisions. Section 3 presents the rating-based model in which we
will be working. Section 4 discusses real-world and risk-neutral rating transition
probabilities. Section 5 reports results of calibrating the rating-based model to
ﬁxed-coupon bonds to compare theoretical and market values of step-up bonds.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Provisions and their market values
Corporate bonds with step-up provisions have primarily been issued by the major
companies in the European telecom sector, most of which are former state monop-
olies. These companies have been forced by liberalization of the market into more
high risk/high yield activities, most notably in the mobile phone market. In par-
ticular, the major players needed to ﬁnance their participation in auctions for the
so-called UMTS licenses needed to operate the ’third-generation’ mobile phone
technology. The huge expenses to acquire these licenses (the auctions produced
a total revenue of 120 billion euros in Europe), the large expenses in actually
developing the new technology (estimates are as high as 80 billion euros in total)
and the high uncertainty in estimating the cash ﬂows produced by the new tech-
nology caused strong negative reactions in the equity markets. These negative
reactions were reinforced by the general downturn in the technology sector and
have made equity ﬁnancing less attractive. Instead the major companies in the
telecom sector have ﬁnanced the investments through large debt issues, and most
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of these issues in recent years had step-up provisions. By February 2003, the mar-
ket for step-up telecom bonds consisted of 65 issues with a total euro equivalent
outstanding amount of 107 billion.2 In addition to that, a few step-up bonds have
been issued in other sectors. Deutsche Telekom (DT), France Telecom (FT) and
British Telecom are the three major issuers accounting for 30%, 23% and 17%,
respectively, of the total amount. The problems of the telecom sector and the
increased leverages caused a line of downgrades from the rating agencies, which
has activated many of the step-up clauses. The rating activity involving DT and
FT is summarized in Table 7, Appendix A. In less than three years Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) in total downgraded DT by 11 notches and FT by 14
notches.3 Despite the problems of the telecom sector, investors may be convinced
that the companies oﬀer a limited risk of actual default, simply because many of
the companies still have a large fraction of shares owned by the government and
because they are so vital in providing infrastructure that they are in a sense ’too
big to fail’.4
The cash ﬂow of the step-up bonds is explicitly linked to the credit rating of
the issuer. The precise language of the link varies from issue to issue, but for all
issues it is deﬁned in terms of the ratings with modiﬁers of senior unsecured debt
from the two major rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P.
Provisions have diﬀerent step amounts and diﬀerent rating event triggers. In
some cases, as with the DT issues, a step-up of the coupon requires a downgrade
to the trigger level by both rating agencies. In other cases, as with the FT issues
maturing in 2004 and 2008, there are step-up triggers for actions of each rating
agency. Here, a downgrade by one agency will trigger an increase in the coupon
regardless of the rating from the other agency.
Provisions also vary with respect to step-down features which, as the name
suggests, trigger a lowering of the coupon if the company regains its original
rating after a downgrade. There is no step-down below the initial coupon for
ratings exceeding the initial rating.5 KPN and Telstra have issued step-up bonds
2Market statistics are from ”Telecom Coupon Steps - Navigating the Maze and Disseminat-
ing Value”, Credit Suisse First Boston (February 14, 2003).
3Notches refer to the rating system with modiﬁers. For example a movement from Baa1 to
Baa2 in Moody’s system is a one notch move.
4This is also explicitly recognized by the rating agencies, particularly evident in the case of
FT. As we shall see, the rating of FT has for a long period been several categories better than
the rating implied by the EDF (the Moody’s/KMV measure of credit quality). The French
government, holding 55.5% of the equity, has on several occasions indicated that it will support
the debt-reduction programme of FT. In December 2002, the government granted FT a 9 billion
euro loan, the terms of which are being investigated by the European Commission for illegal
state aid.
5Credit-sensitive notes with step-down below the initial coupon have been observed, e.g.
the Enron issue considered by Ogden and Moon (1993) and Das and Tufano (1996). Results
indicated that this covenant had positive market value due to a large step-up schedule and only
a small step-down schedule below the initial coupon.
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without step-down provisions making these issues path-dependent. However, the
most common construction stipulates that coupons are stepped down if the rating
rises above the trigger level again, which is also the case for the issues of DT and
FT. If a step-up is triggered by a unanimous downgrade, as for the DT issues and
one of the FT issues, it requires a unanimous upgrade by both agencies to step
down the coupon again. This way of structuring step-down makes these issues
path-dependent as we shall see in Section 3.1.
Additionally, the provisions diﬀer with respect to what happens with further
downgrades. The DT issues only have two possible coupon levels, whereas the FT
and British Telecom issues have continual step-ups for every further downgrade.
Typically, the change of coupon takes place on the second coupon date after
the triggering change of rating has been announced, i.e. the change of coupon
starts accruing at the following coupon date. This is the case for the DT and
FT step-up bonds. For a few issues of KPN and Telstra, however, the change
of coupon is eﬀective immediately and calculated as a pro-rata step-up for the
remaining part of the coupon period. This structure is computationally more
involved since rating probabilities are needed at any point in the future and not
just at discrete coupon dates, as in the cases we consider.
2.1 Data
Our relative pricing approach requires ﬁxed-coupon bonds of the same issuers
comparable to the step-up issues in terms of currency, liquidity and priority. We
refer to the comparable ﬁxed-coupon bonds as reference bonds. We restrict our
sample to issuers with at least two reference bonds, which leaves us with the euro
issues of DT and FT. As mentioned DT and FT are the most active issuers of
step-up bonds, accounting for more than half of the total market outstanding
amount. For the third largest issuer, British Telecom, and for the dollar step-up
issues of DT and FT, there are too few reference bonds. We exclude DT step-up
bonds maturing after 2010 from our analysis since the longest DT reference bond
matures in 2008. Table 1 lists the step-up bonds in our study, covering around
20% of the market for step-up bonds.
As reference bonds we select all ﬁxed-coupon bonds satisfying the following
criteria: non-callable, same priority as the step-up bonds, issued in euro, out-
standing amount of at least 500 million euro, issued after January 1, 1998, and
time to maturity more than six months. This leaves us with the reference bonds
listed in Table 1. One ﬁxed-coupon bond (DT 4.25% maturing Jan 17 2005) is
excluded since the price data indicate low liquidity – we observe 20 unchanged
day-to-day prices for this bond. In the latter part of the sample we have up to
ﬁve reference bonds from each issuer, whereas in the early part we only have two.
This is not much to estimate the issuer-speciﬁc discount curves, but we leave out
the illiquid bonds since, in particular, some of the smallest DT and oldest FT
bonds are severely aﬀected by low liquidity due to low circulating amounts. The
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Amount Issued Rating level Agency Step-up
m EUR to trigger to trigger amount, bp
Step-up bonds:
DT 6.125% Jul 6 2005 2,250 Jun 2000 Baa1/BBB+ both 50 one-oﬀ
DT 5.875% Jul 11 2006 4,500 Jul 2001 Baa1/BBB+ both 50 one-oﬀ
DT 7.5% May 29 2007 2,500 May 2002 Baa2/BBB both 50 one-oﬀ
DT 6.125% Dec 4 2007 500 Nov 2002 Baa2/BBB both 50 one-oﬀ
DT 5.75% Feb 12 2008 1,000 Jan 2003 Baa2/BBB both 50 one-oﬀ
DT 6.5% Oct 7 2009 500 Sep 2002 Baa2/BBB both 50 one-oﬀ
FT 5.75% Mar 14 2004 3,500 Mar 2001 Baa1/BBB+ either 25 per notch, per agency
FT 5% Feb 26 2005 2,750 Nov 2001 Baa2/BBB both 20 per notch
FT 6.75% Mar 14 2008 3,500 Mar 2001 Baa1/BBB+ either 25 per notch, per agency
Reference bonds:
DT 4.625% Aug 28 2003 1,000 Aug 2001
DT 5.25% Sep 24 2004 500 Sep 2002
DT 5.5% Sep 30 2005 500 Sep 2002
DT 5.25% Jan 22 2007 500 Jan 2002
DT 5.25% May 20 2008 2,000 May 1998
FT 6.125% Nov 10 2005 1,000 Oct 2000
FT 6% Sep 28 2007 1,000 Jan 2003
FT 7% Dec 23 2009 2,000 Dec 2002
FT 6.625% Nov 10 2010 1,400 Oct 2000
FT 7.25% Jan 28 2013 3,000 Jan 2003
Table 1: Euro step-up and reference bonds issued by DT and FT. Ratings are
Moody’s/S&P. Reference bonds are comparable ﬁxed-coupon bonds. All bonds have
annual coupon payments. Source: Bloomberg and bond prospectuses.
low number of reference bonds does not allow us to derive a unique arbitrage-free
step-up bond price, but we can still get estimates for the relative pricing of step-
up bonds using diﬀerent reference bonds and calibration methods. We return to
this issue in Section 5.2.
Throughout this paper we use daily bond prices from Bloomberg, obtained
from the Bloomberg generic price source. As the default-free benchmark, we
take the German government zero-coupon yield curve obtained from Bundesbank,
estimated by the extended Nelson-Siegel method of Svensson (1994). The sample
period for DT is August 6, 2001, to October 7, 2003, the start of which is chosen
as the issue date of the second DT reference bond. The sample period for FT
is March 7, 2001, to October 7, 2003, beginning with the issuance of the ﬁrst
FT step-up bonds. The sample consists of 551 and 656 trading days for DT
and FT, respectively. We observe 13 unchanged day-to-day bond prices (with 4
decimals). We interpret an unchanged price as a missing price for a bond that
was not traded and remove them from the sample.
Several studies have documented liquidity eﬀects in asset pricing, i.e. the fact
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that investors require a premium for holding assets with lower liquidity than oth-
erwise identical assets. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Warga (1992) showed
that liquidity risk is priced for U.S. government bonds. This has also been docu-
mented for European corporate bonds in a recent study by Houweling, Mentink,
and Vorst (2004a) using a number of liquidity measures. Our dataset provides
three indirect liquidity measures: size, age and missing prices. These three prox-
ies were all found to carry signiﬁcant liquidity premia in Houweling, Mentink,
and Vorst (2004a). Sarig and Warga (1989) argue that liquidity increases with
issue size and decreases with the age of an issue, since the circulation amount
decreases. Furthermore, the number of unchanged day-to-day prices can be seen
as a proxy for quote frequency.
By selection, the size and age are approximately the same in the two groups of
bonds. On average, the step-up bonds have larger outstanding amounts than the
ﬁxed-coupon bonds, which are however also fairly large issues. The ages in the
two groups are comparable. For DT, we observe 11 unchanged day-to-day market
prices for the step-up bond maturing in 2005 and none for all the other bonds.
Thus, this single step-up bond could be less liquid than the reference bonds but
this is not the case for the rest of the step-up bonds. We keep this bond in the
sample for completeness, and we will see that the results for this step-up bond do
not diﬀer from those of the other step-up bonds. For FT, we observe one missing
price for each of the two groups of bonds. All in all, there is no evidence from
traditional liquidity proxies that step-up bonds should, in general, be less liquid
than the reference bonds.
2.2 Market values
In this preliminary analysis we estimate the market value attached to each of the
step-up clauses (on each given trading day) by computing the diﬀerence between
the observed market price of the step-up bond and the theoretical value of the
same bond obtained by discounting the bond’s regular cash ﬂow on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
yield curve. The regular cash ﬂow is the minimal cash ﬂow, the bondholder will
receive, if there is no default before maturity. Hence, the regular cash ﬂow seen
from date t consists of the initially scheduled payments after t and possibly an
already triggered step-up payment at the ﬁrst coupon date after t. Thus, a neg-
ative market value would be evidence of underpricing – a negative price for the
non-negative potential future step-up payments above the initial coupon level.
The issuer-speciﬁc yield curves are obtained by ﬁtting the credit spreads above
the German government zero-coupon yield curve for the reference bonds. In do-
ing that, we apply a continuous piecewise-linear bootstrapping method requiring
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constant spreads outside the range of available maturities.6 Figure 1 presents the
bootstrapped credit spreads. The spreads have generally had an increasing trend
in the early part of the sample, consistent with the increasing leverage ratios,
followed by a massive decline in 2003.
Figure 2 illustrates the calculated market values in percentage of face value
for selected step-up issues, whereas Table 2 summarizes the market values for
all the step-up bonds in consideration. In general the provisions of FT have
higher market value than the provisions of DT, which was to be expected since
the DT provisions have a maximum step-up of only 50 bp. As can be seen, the
market values ﬂuctuate a lot and are not persistently positive. In fact, all DT
step-up provisions have negative market values on average in the periods before
step-up payments have been triggered. The provisions only have signiﬁcant pos-
itive market values in periods where step-up triggers have been activated. The
sub-samples suggest a general trend that the market values of step-up provisions
have increased consistent with the declining credit ratings. Furthermore, if we ex-
trapolate the constant credit spread to longer maturities, calculations not shown
indicate that DT step-up provisions maturing in 2010, 2011 and 2012 also have
had signiﬁcantly negative market values.
One could argue that the reference bonds used to construct the company
curves are too few. The conclusion for the step-up bonds, however, is general
across all maturities. We observe periods with negative provision market values
for all step-up bonds whether they mature before, between or after the reference
bonds used to construct the ﬁrm-speciﬁc curves. In ﬁtting the curves, we assume a
linear spread structure between reference bonds. The structure between reference
bonds could be concave but to explain all the negative step-up market values, the
structure would need to be convex between step-up bonds. It seems very hard
to come up with a reasonable story about ﬁrm-speciﬁc default probabilities that
would lead to a credit spread structure with signiﬁcant humps at all the step-up
maturities. In particular towards the end of the sample, we see negative values
for the latter step-up issues although we have more reference bonds to estimate
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc spread curve. As mentioned, we will return to this important
issue in Section 5.2.
Summing up, the ﬁrst investigation suggests that in general the market values
attached to the step-up provisions are very volatile and in fact very small – in
6To be clear, assuming we calibrate to N bonds maturing at T1 < · · · < TN ,
spreadt =


α1 for t ≤ T1
Tn+1−t
Tn+1−Tnαn +
t−Tn
Tn+1−Tnαn+1 for Tn < t ≤ Tn+1, n = 1, . . . , N − 1
αN for t > TN
where α1, . . . , αN are chosen to match the N bond prices exactly. This appears to be more
robust than a piecewise-constant bootstrapping method especially when the distances between
maturities are relatively large.
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Figure 1: Yield spreads (bp) for maturities one and ten years. Obtained by
bootstrapping the yield spread above the German government zero-coupon yield curve
for the reference bonds.
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Figure 2: Estimated market values (in % of face value) of step-up provi-
sions. The market value is computed as the market price minus the theoretical value
of the regular cash ﬂow valued on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc zero-coupon yield curve. The regular
cash ﬂow is deﬁned as the remaining part of the initially scheduled payments plus a
potentially already triggered step-up payment at the next coupon date.
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Entire sample Sub-sample Sub-sample Sub-sample
2001 2002 2003
DT 6.125% Jul 6 2005 0.15 (0.54) -0.57 (0.20) 0.13 (0.50) 0.55 (0.25)
DT 5.875% Jul 11 2006 0.05 (0.91) -1.19 (0.32) -0.06 (0.73) 0.83 (0.42)
DT 7.5% May 29 2007 -0.37 (0.81) - -0.89 (0.87) 0.04 (0.46)
DT 6.125% Dec 4 2007 -0.34 (0.62) - -1.01 (0.23) -0.26 (0.61)
DT 5.75% Feb 12 2008 -1.51 (1.22) - -2.68 (0.77) -1.13 (1.10)
DT 6.5% Oct 7 2009 -2.73 (1.90) - -4.06 (1.60) -1.69 (1.40)
FT 5.75% Mar 14 2004 0.53 (0.62) 0.62 (0.47) 0.43 (0.68) 0.57 (0.65)
FT 5% Feb 26 2005 -0.05 (0.65) -0.01 (0.14) -0.42 (0.70) 0.41 (0.12)
FT 6.75% Mar 14 2008 1.20 (1.64) -0.33 (1.06) 1.63 (1.64) 2.25 (0.79)
Table 2: Estimated market values (in % of face value) of the step-up pro-
visions. Average (and standard deviation) of daily observations. The market value is
computed as the market price minus the theoretical value of the regular cash ﬂow val-
ued on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc zero-coupon yield curve. The regular cash ﬂow is deﬁned as the
remaining part of the initially scheduled payments plus a potentially already triggered
step-up payment at the next coupon date.
many cases even negative – which can apparently not be attributed to diﬀerences
in traditional liquidity measures. These model-independent observations provide
some evidence of underpricing in the periods before step-ups have been activated.
To address this issue in the entire sample and to give quantitative estimates, we
need a rating-based pricing model.
3 A rating-based model
We apply the model of JLT which is a natural framework to handle the explicit
rating-dependence of the step-up provisions. We also considered valuing the pro-
visions by modelling the companies’ EDF (i.e. the expected default frequencies
used by Moody’s/KMV) – a measure of credit quality based on a modiﬁed struc-
tural approach originating from Merton (1974). Rating transitions could then
be speciﬁed as the EDF (or a smoothed version of the EDF) crossing certain
thresholds, and the EDF could serve as the default intensity. This was however
not possible in our case for two reasons. First, there is no clear consistent map-
ping from the EDF (or a smoothed version of the EDF) to credit rating. As can
be seen from Figure 3, the actual rating and the EDF-implied rating (using the
EDF/rating mapping shown on EDF graphs) deviate by as much as 3-6 rating
classes for more than a year. Second, using the EDF as default intensity would be
out of line with bond market prices. For FT, the EDFs where much higher than
the implied default intensities in the bond market after June 2002. A possible
explanation for the huge diﬀerence between the default probability implicit in the
11
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Figure 3: Actual ratings vs. EDF-implied ratings. EDF is Moody’s/KMV’s
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Aa1, ..., 17 = Caa, 18 = D. The EDF-implied ratings have been obtained using the
EDF/rating mapping shown on EDF graphs. Source: Moody’s/KMV.
equity market and in the debt market is that the perception of ’too big to fail’
and the possible government support aﬀects equity- and bondholders asymmet-
rically. In that case, the default probabilities implied from the debt market are
more reliable. Hence, we base our analysis on debt market observations.
We consider a ﬁltered probability space
(
Ω,FT , {Ft}0≤t≤T , P
)
, where the ﬁl-
tration is deﬁned later. We assume the existence of an equivalent martingale
measure, Q, under which all pricing is done, which is essentially equivalent to
assuming absence of arbitrage. In the JLT model the rating process, denoted by
ηt, is a Markov
7 chain with discrete state space given by the rating categories
1, . . . , K, where 1 refers to the highest rating category and K refers to default.
In the discrete-time version applied here, the Markov chain is governed by the
7In practise, ratings are likely to violate the Markov property. There is evidence of rating
momentum – Bangia et al. (2002) and Lando and Skødeberg (2002) report that recently down-
graded/upgraded issuers tend to have an increased/decreased probability of downgrade and
default. We take the Markov setting as an approximation. A non-Markovian model, calibrated
to the same reference bond prices, would attach more value to the step-up provisions in default
scenarios, stemming from more gradual defaults relative to immediate defaults. On the other
hand, non-default scenarios would give relatively more probability mass to non-downgrade sce-
narios. The total eﬀect of non-Markovian ratings on the value of step-up provisions will depend
on the language of the step-up clause and whether it has already been triggered or not, and is
likely to be small.
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rating transition probability matrices under Q
Q(t, t + n) = [qij(t, t + n)]i,j=1,...,K
where qij(t, t + n) = Q(ηt+n = j | ηt = i) is the risk-neutral probability of
a rating migration from i at time t to j at time t + n. All rows sum to unity,∑K
j=1 qij(t, t+n) = 1, and the default probabilities are found in the K’th column.
The K’th row of the matrix has 1 in the diagonal, since we assume that default is
an absorbing state.8 The multi-period rating probabilities of the Markov chain are
obtained from the one-period probabilities by Q(t, t+n) =
∏n
i=1 Q(t+i−1, t+i).9
In Section 4 we will discuss the estimation of the risk-neutral as well as the real-
world rating transition probabilities denoted by P (t, t+n) = [pij(t, t+n)]i,j=1,...,K .
Denote by τ the time of default, i.e. the absorbtion time of the Markov
chain. In the event of default we assume a fractional recovery of face value,
δ, paid at the time of default.10 Recovery of face value at default is a good
approximation to the legal practise in liquidation and ﬁnds empirical support in
a recent study by Guha (2003). We put δ = 0.44 consistent with Moody’s average
recovery for senior unsecured claims in the period 1982-2000 (Hamilton, Cantor,
and Ou (2002)), measured as the bond price one month after default as a fraction
of principal. Das and Tufano (1996) extend the model by allowing stochastic
recovery rates and thereby capture the realistic feature of stochastic credit spreads
within rating categories. As we shall see, we allow for diﬀerent credit spreads
within the same rating categories from two sources. We adjust the transition
probabilities for rating outlook, and we calibrate the transition probabilities to
the spread of the speciﬁc issuer, although we do not set up a stochastic model
for it.11 We prefer adjusting the rating probabilities instead of adjusting the
recovery rates, since it seems more plausible that investors constantly revise their
default probabilities than their recovery expectations, at least for investment
grade issuers. Moreover, we include multiple issues of the same issuer and priority,
and therefore we must require identical recovery rates across bonds.
The default-free term structure of interest rates can be speciﬁed by any
arbitrage-free model, and the value at time t of the bank account is denoted
by Bt. The cash ﬂows we will be evaluating depend on the rating processes
8The recovery payment at the time of absorption corresponds to the post-default marked
value of the claim. This value in turn reﬂects investors’ expectations of a future recovery
payment in liquidation or after a possible restructuring process.
9Probabilities at non-integer dates are found by linear interpolation.
10The recovery rate need not be constant, but must be uncorrelated with interest rates and
default times. For stochastic recovery, δ denotes the (risk-neutral) expected recovery.
11We could incorporate the stochastic behavior of transition probabilities and specify stochas-
tic credit spreads within a ﬁxed rating class along the lines of Lando (1998). However, since
our focus is on the relative pricing of the step-up bonds compared to the bonds with no such
provisions, we believe that the eﬀect of stochastic ﬂuctuations in spreads within a class are
likely to be second-order compared to the eﬀect of credit class migration which is captured in
our approach.
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of both Moody’s and S&P denoted by ηM and ηS, respectively. Deﬁne the ﬁl-
tration, {Ft}0≤t≤T , as the natural ﬁltration generated by the rating processes
and the state variables driving the default-free term structure of interest rates,
and let conditional probabilities and expectations with respect to Ft under the
risk-neutral measure be denoted by Qt(·) and EQt (·), respectively. The price at
time t of a default-free zero-coupon bond maturing at time tm (less than T ) is
B(t, tm) = E
Q
t [Bt/Btm ].
As in JLT, we assume independence between the rating process and the in-
terest rate process under Q.12 Assume that a relevant issuer is rated ηMt = i
and ηSt = j. The time-t price of a risky coupon bond, C
(i,j)(t, tm), maturing at
tm with coupon payments c at the remaining coupon dates t1 < t2 < · · · < tm
is given by the expected value under the risk-neutral measure of the discounted
promised cash ﬂow plus the recovery payment in the event of default
C(i,j)(t, tm) =
m∑
n=1
cB(t, tn)Qt(τ > tn) + B(t, tm)Qt(τ > tm) (1)
+ EQt
[
δ
Bt
Bτ
1{τ≤tm}
]
3.1 Step-up bonds
A step-up bond can be decomposed into an otherwise identical ﬁxed-coupon bond
and the step-up cash ﬂow: C
(i,j)
step (t, tm) = C
(i,j)(t, tm) + S
(i,j)(t, tm). The value of
the step-up cash ﬂow for the FT step-up bonds maturing in 2004 and 2008 is
S(i,j)(t, tm) = E
Q
t
[
m∑
n=1
1{τ>tn} f(η
M
tn−1 , η
S
tn−1)
Bt
Btn
]
(2)
where t0 ≤ t is the previous coupon date (if it exists), and f(i, j) is the step-up
coupon deﬁned by the provisions. For these two issues f(i, j) = 0.0025[i− 7]+ +
12Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (1995), Duﬀee (1998) and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Mar-
tin (2001) provide evidence that credit spreads are negatively correlated with interest rates,
most signiﬁcantly for lower credit qualities and longer maturities. Duﬀee (1999) also reports
signs of negative correlation, although of much less signiﬁcance. We apply the independence
assumption as an approximation, which could be relaxed using the generalized Markov chain
model of Lando (1998). For the purpose of pricing step-up bonds relative to similar ﬁxed-
coupon bonds, the correlation eﬀect is likely to be very small. Lando (1994) shows that assum-
ing independence, if the true correlation is negative (and if interest rates are positively serially
correlated), implies upward-biased bond prices. This goes for both types of bonds, and in the
case of negative correlation the independence assumption gives a slightly conservative estimate
of the theoretical value of step-up provisions, since the states of nature with step-up payments
would have a tendency to be associated with low interest rates. Furthermore, the empirical
evidence of negative correlation is based on bond indices or pools of bonds. The sign of the
correlation for the assets and liabilities of a speciﬁc company is not obvious.
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0.0025[j − 7]+, since A3/A- corresponds to i = j = 7 in the rating systems with
18 categories. Thus,
S(i,j)(t, tm) = 0.0025B(t, t1)
(
[ηMt0 − 7]+ + [ηSt0 − 7]+
)
Qt(τ > t1)
+
m∑
n=2
0.0025B(t, tn)
K−1∑
k=8
[k − 7]Qt(ηMtn−1 = k)Qt(τ > tn | ηMtn−1 = k)
+
m∑
n=2
0.0025B(t, tn)
K−1∑
l=8
[l − 7]Qt(ηStn−1 = l)Qt(τ > tn | ηStn−1 = l)
The step-up issues of DT and the FT 2005 issue are, as mentioned, com-
plicated by their path-dependent step-down structure. Initially, a step-up is
triggered for a coupon date if both ratings are downgraded to the trigger level
at the previous coupon date. Subsequent to a step-up, step-down is triggered
if both ratings are above the trigger level at a later coupon date. Therefore,
in case of a split rating (ηM = ηS) across a trigger level, the two ratings are
not suﬃcient to determine the coupon payment at the next coupon date – the
information of the level of step-up triggered at the previous coupon date is also
needed. This path-dependence can be eliminated by including an extra state
variable. Let utn denote the amount of step-up triggered at the date tn for the
payment date tn+1. Then utn is a function of its previous value and the ratings
at tn, utn = f(utn−1 , η
M
tn , η
S
tn), and the value of the step-up cash ﬂow is
S(i,j)(t, tm) = E
Q
t
[ m∑
n=1
1{τ>tn} f(utn−2 , η
M
tn−1 , η
S
tn−1)
Bt
Btn
]
(3)
where t−1 < t0 ≤ t are the previous coupon dates (if they exist). The details of
computing this expected value and the precise deﬁnition of the function f in the
path-dependent cases can be found in Appendix B.
The value of the provisions can be approximated by ignoring the path-dependence
and assuming no step-up at the previous coupon date (u = 0). This gives a
provision value that is always lower than the value obtained by including the
path-dependence (since f(u, k, l) ≥ f(0, k, l) for all u, k and l), but the step-up
payments only diﬀer for possible step-downs in cases with split ratings across the
trigger level. This occurs with low probability unless it is the initial state. To
illustrate the diﬀerence, the FT 2005 step-up provision has a (base case) theo-
retical value of 0.164 at issuance, whereas the approximation ignoring the path-
dependence gives rise to the slightly lower value 0.162. The diﬀerence, however,
is large if the initial state is a split rating across a trigger level. At the end of the
sample, FT has the split rating Baa3/BBB, and the (base case) provision value
is 0.732 versus 0.599 ignoring the path-dependence. Therefore, implementing the
precise structure of the provisions is important.
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3.2 Split ratings and rating correlation
The DT step-up bonds and the FT 2005 step-up bond are deﬁned on rating
events involving both Moody’s and S&P. The two agencies’ ratings of the same
company are obviously positively correlated but split ratings are often observed.
As mentioned, the value of the provisions can be seriously aﬀected by split ratings.
Thus, it is important to account for split ratings and rating correlation in the
model. The natural way to incorporate correlated ratings is to enlarge the state
space of the Markov chain to K2 states, which could reasonably be reduced since
most of the states would be highly unlikely – split ratings of more than, say, two
notches are rare and usually only observed in short time intervals. The problem,
however, is estimating the joint rating transition probabilities. To circumvent
this problem, we will make a simplifying assumption which gives a reasonable
approximation of the step-up values.
It is often observed that the rating of one agency adapts to the rating of the
other agency. We simply assume a ﬁxed (risk-neutral) probability, A, of adaption
at the end of each one-year period. In case of adaption, we assume that the two
rating agencies have equal probabilities of being the leader and the follower. That
is, with probability A, the ratings migrate from (i, j) to (k, k) with probability
1
2
qMik (t, t + 1) +
1
2
qSjk(t, t + 1). With probability 1− A, the ratings do not adapt.
In this case, we conjecture that the ratings migrate independently from (i, j) to
(k, l) with probability qMik (t, t + 1) · qSjl(t, t + 1). Note that in both cases, and
thus in total, the probabilities sum to one. We set A = 0.8 to reﬂect that the
agencies agree most of the time. This is admittedly arbitrary but in Section 5.2
we demonstrate that the conclusions are insensitive to this parameter.
4 The rating transition probabilities
In the pricing of rating-sensitive assets we need to assess the likelihood of future
rating migrations – not just the default probabilities. The historical rating transi-
tion matrices published by the rating agencies contain valuable information about
an average ﬁrm in an average state of the economy, but we need risk-neutral rat-
ing probabilities for a speciﬁc issuer at a speciﬁc point in time. To obtain that,
we ﬁrst modify the historical rating matrix according to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc rating
outlook. Next, the risk-neutral rating matrix is obtained through a calibration to
the implied default probabilities in observed (ﬁxed-coupon) bond prices, which at
the same time ensures ﬁrm- and time-speciﬁc probabilities. We discuss existing
methods and propose a new method for calibrating the rating-based model to
implied default probabilities. For notational simplicity the time-dependence of
the rating transition matrices is suppressed throughout this section.
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4.1 Rating outlook
In addition to the ratings, the rating agencies assign a rating outlook which is
important for the valuation of step-up provisions. An unstable outlook can be
interpreted as being in between two rating classes. We account for the rating
outlook by adjusting the ﬁrst-year rating transition matrix in the relevant row,
i, in the following way13
p˜ij =
{
(1− ξ) pij + ξ pi−1,j if positive outlook
(1− ξ) pij + ξ pi+1,j if negative outlook
(4)
for j = 1, . . . , K, where ξ ∈ (0, 1). Some statistics on the population of ﬁrms with
unstable rating outlook are available from Keenan, Fons, and Carty (1998). Using
the default frequencies from this source, we estimate ξ = 0.53 for the statements
’review for possible up-/downgrade’ from Moody’s. We use the same parameter
value for the statements ’positive/negative watch’ from S&P. For the weaker
statements ’negative/positive outlook’ from both agencies, we choose ξ = 0.3 as
a plausible parameter value between 0 and 0.53.
4.2 Risk-neutral rating transition probabilities
Economic theory tells us that assets positively correlated with aggregate con-
sumption are attached with positive risk premia, and there is evidence that de-
fault (and downgrade) frequencies are counter-cyclical. Furthermore, the implied
default probabilities (even after adjusting for non-default-related parts of the
credit spreads) are usually higher than empirically observed default frequencies,
and empirical ﬁndings of Elton et al. (2001) and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and
Martin (2001) suggest that credit spreads are to a relatively large extent driven
by common systematic market factors. For these reasons we allow for risk premia
in corporate bond spreads. The risk premium adjustments we propose may re-
ﬂect either the sensitivity of the telecom issues to such systematic factors or a risk
premium attributed to default of a telecom issuer which would have a profound
impact on the European ﬁnancial markets. In the following we do not distinguish
between these two explanations.
One way of assessing the risk-neutral rating transition probabilities is calibrat-
ing the rating-based model to corporate bond prices. Diﬀerent low-dimensional,
13The step-up cash ﬂows do not explicitly depend on rating outlooks but still the rating
transition probabilities should be aﬀected by the initial outlook. Therefore, we choose to simply
adjust the ﬁrst-year transition matrix, instead of incorporating outlooks as additional states
in the Markov chain. This corresponds to randomizing the initial state in the Markov chain
across the states i − 1, i and i + 1. A company can be assigned an unstable outlook for more
than one year but adjusting the ﬁrst-year probabilities also alters the cumulative probabilities
at longer horizons.
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parametric risk adjustments of the empirical transition matrix have been pro-
posed. The purpose of these adjustments is to avoid implying out all the parame-
ters of the risk-neutral transition probability matrix. Implying out all parameters
from scratch is not possible from the observed data, and it would disregard any
information about the structure of the risk-neutral transition probabilities which
one would expect to be contained in the empirical transition probabilities. How-
ever, the particular choice of parametric risk adjustment signiﬁcantly aﬀects the
non-default probabilities in the risk-neutral transition matrix, and therefore it is
important to have a numerically stable and economically meaningful calibration
method.
The method we are going to propose has the advantage of adjusting the risks of
downgrade and default in the same direction (upwards) and the probability of up-
grade in the opposite direction. This is consistent with thinking of rating changes
as occurring when the issuer’s assets cross certain thresholds and assuming that
assets have a higher positive drift under the empirical probability measure than
under the risk-neutral measure. The fact that risk-neutral upgrade and down-
grade probabilities are adjusted in opposite directions also is more consistent with
the way we think of the risk-adjustment as possibly capturing a deviation in the
issuer-speciﬁc transition matrix from the sector- or industry-wide matrix used
for calibration. If, for example, the market believes that a particular company
is riskier than what is implied by its current rating, then the market may price
the issuer’s debt using larger downgrade probabilities and smaller upgrade prob-
abilities simply because the market believes the empirical transition probability
for the issuer is diﬀerent. The calibration method we propose is consistent with
such a pricing behavior.
We give a brief review of the methods proposed in the literature before we
propose our new method. JLT propose the following adjustment
qij =
{
θi pij for j = i
1− θi (1− pii) for j = i
(5)
for i = 1, . . . , K − 1 and j = 1, . . . , K. This method eﬀectively speeds up/down
the rating process. In each row, it implies that upgrade and default entries
are adjusted in the same direction, which is counter-intuitive. Unfortunately,
extremely high θ’s are often needed, since the empirical default probabilities
are very low for high credit ratings and even zero in some cases, making the
method infeasible, as we shall see in an example below.14 Also, small changes
in the uncertain empirical estimates of high grade default probabilities lead to
extremely high changes in risk adjustments.
KK address the numerical problems with the method of JLT and propose the
14The problems arise because the method is based on a discrete-time approximation of the
transition matrix from the generator matrix. For more on this, see Lando (2004).
18
following alternative adjustment
qij =
{
θi pij for j = K
1− θi (1− piK) for j = K
(6)
This proves to be numerically stable, but it implies counter-intuitively that de-
fault and downgrade entries are adjusted in opposite directions.15 More realistic
adjustments, taking the same direction for downgrade and default and the oppo-
site for upgrade, could easily be obtained by introducing one adjustment factor
for upgrades and another for downgrades, where the latter factor is e.g. the in-
verse of the former. But instead of this technical modiﬁcation of the KK method
we seek a functional form for the adjustments inspired by economic theory as
explained in the following.
Consider a one-period model from t to t + 1 with discrete state space given
by the K rating classes, which is of course highly restrictive but only used to
motivate a functional form for the calibration. Let i be the initial state. Assume
that all agents16 have utility from (consuming) wealth according to the power
utility function u(w) = w
1−θ
1−θ , implying a constant relative risk aversion of θ. The
traded assets are the riskless bank account and a risky T -period zero-coupon
bond priced Vi(t). Assume furthermore a constant riskless interest rate, r, and
constant credit spreads, sj, in each of the rating classes. Then Vj(t) = e
−(r+sj)T .
By the end of the period, the state of the world is j with real-world probability
pij, for j = 1, . . . , K.
It is well-known that the ﬁrst order condition for utility-maximizing agents
is an Euler equation implying that the state price density is proportional to the
marginal utility given optimal investment. In our setting this means
qij
pij
= κ u′(wj(t + 1)) =
u′(wj(t + 1))∑K
k=1 pik u
′(wk(t + 1))
(7)
for j = 1, . . . , K, where the wealth in state j at time t + 1 is
wj(t + 1) = ai wi(t)
Vj(t + 1)
Vi(t)
+ (1− ai)wi(t) er (8)
15Furthermore, the method does not ensure that the real-world and risk-neutral probability
measures are equivalent, but this is of no importance if zero-entries in the empirical transition
matrix are considered as poor estimates of very small probabilities of rare events. Moreover,
this applies to any method modifying empirical zero-probabilities into strictly positive implied
probabilities.
16We do not assume the presence of a representative agent, since we do not assume complete
markets.
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and ai denotes the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset.
17 Then
qij
pij
=
[ 1− ai (1− esj+(si−sj)T ) ]−θ∑K
k=1 pik [ 1− ai (1− esk+(si−sk)T ) ]−θ
(9)
for j = 1, . . . , K. Note that the Radon-Nikodym derivative is independent of
initial wealth and the interest rate level. This is the functional form we propose
to use.
A more realistic setting would allow more states of nature, heterogenous
agents, multiple risky assets and time periods, and stochastic interest rates and
credit spreads. In practical application, however, we hope that the functional
form of the risk-adjustments in the stylized setting still provides a good approxi-
mation. As we shall see, the adjustments from (9) certainly seem more reasonable
than the adjustments from the methods of JLT and KK.
Table 3 presents numerical examples, for simplicity in the rating system with
8 categories. Suppose we calibrate a Baa-rated 5-year bond to an implied annual
default probability of 1.5% (which is roughly the level observed for DT in the
relevant rating class, after subtracting a liquidity spread). The real-world rating
transition probabilities are from Moody’s, and the credit spreads are given by
historical average levels.18 We test three diﬀerent values for the optimal fraction
of wealth invested in the bond, a, and in each case the parameter θ is set to
ﬁt the implied default probability (j = K in (9)) and then used to obtain the
risk-neutral non-default probabilities (j = K in (9)). Fortunately, the method is
remarkably stable with respect to the parameter a. Considering the uncertainty
of the underlying estimates of the real-world probabilities, the diﬀerences in the
adjusted probabilities are negligible, even for extreme variations in a. The same
stability is evident from Figure 4 with respect to the bond maturity, T . The
credit spreads in the diﬀerent rating categories matter but they are, at least
to some extent, approximately observable from market data. The parameter
θ is sensitive to a and T and seems implausibly high – this does not indicate
some kind of ’corporate bond premium puzzle’, since θ is to be interpreted as
an adjustment parameter, and not as a relative risk aversion, when we apply the
method outside the stylized economy which was only considered for motivational
purpose. As mentioned, the adjustment accounts for any discrepancy between
17To ensure internal consistency in the stylized economy, ai should be determined in agree-
ment with Vi(t) =
∑K
j=1 qije
−rVj(t + 1). We are however not interested in the value of ai, but
only in the risk-adjustments, and they are as we shall see very insensitive to the value of ai.
Therefore, we do not apply this restriction on ai.
18Historical default probabilities are from Hamilton, Cantor, and Ou (2002), corrected
for withdrawn ratings. The investment grade spreads are consistent with Longstaﬀ and
Schwartz (1995), the speculative grade spreads with Caouette, Altman, and Narayanan (1998).
The credit spread in default corresponds to a 50% recovery of Treasury with r = 5%, i.e. sK
satisﬁes e−(r+sK)(T−1) = 0.5e−r(T−1). Recovery of face value is inappropriate for zero-coupon
bonds used for illustration in this stylized setting.
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Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa D
P -probabilities, pij (%) 0.05 0.26 5.45 88.55 4.72 0.72 0.09 0.16
Credit spreads, sj (bp) 50 80 120 180 300 450 900 1733
Utility-based, a = 1 (θ = 3.64)
Q-probabilities, qij (%) 0.04 0.22 4.88 86.57 5.50 1.04 0.25 1.50
Q/P -ratios, qij/pij 0.81 0.85 0.90 0.98 1.16 1.45 2.79 9.38
Utility-based, a = 0.5 (θ = 8.51)
Q-probabilities, qij (%) 0.04 0.21 4.80 86.42 5.65 1.10 0.28 1.50
Q/P -ratios, qij/pij 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.98 1.20 1.53 3.08 9.38
Utility-based, a = 0.01 (θ = 479.48)
Q-probabilities, qij (%) 0.04 0.21 4.72 86.30 5.78 1.16 0.30 1.50
Q/P -ratios, qij/pij 0.75 0.80 0.87 0.97 1.23 1.61 3.31 9.38
JLT (θ = 9.38)
Q-probabilities, qij (%) 0.47 2.44 51.09 -7.34 44.25 6.75 0.84 1.50
Q/P -ratios, qij/pij 9.38 9.38 9.38 -0.08 9.38 9.38 9.38 9.38
KK (θ = 0.99)
Q-probabilities, qij (%) 0.05 0.26 5.38 87.36 4.66 0.71 0.09 1.50
Q/P -ratios, qij/pij 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 9.38
Table 3: Comparison of calibration methods. Implied one-year transition prob-
abilities for Baa with an implied default probability of 1.5% and Moody’s empirical
transition probabilities. The utility-based method is applied with T = 5, historical
average credit spread levels, and three diﬀerent values of a.
ﬁrm-speciﬁc implied market probabilities and the historical average probabilities
– and not just risk premia.
For comparison, Table 3 also reports the implied probabilities obtained from
the JLT and KK methods. As can be seen, the former is infeasible with the chosen
discretization, and the adjustments of the utility-based method are more intuitive
than those of the KK method. Note also, that no parameter restriction is needed
to ensure non-negative probabilities in the utility-based method. However, as the
JLT method, the utility-based method is very sensitive to the exact values of the
real-world default probabilities. To alleviate this problem we apply a smoothed
version of the empirical rating matrix, see Appendix C.
Having seen that the functional form suggested by the stylized economy pro-
vides more intuitive risk-neutral rating probabilities, we proceed with this method
and perform robustness tests using the method of KK. Given the stability of the
implied rating probabilities with respect to a and T , it seems reasonable to apply
(9) with a = 0.5 and T = 5, the latter representing the maturities we consider
reasonably well. That is, we apply
qij(t, t + 1)
pij(t, t + 1)
=
[1 + esj+5(si−sj)]−θt+1∑K
k=1 pik(t, t + 1) [1 + e
sk+5(si−sk)]−θt+1
(10)
for j = 1, . . . , K, with the credit spreads reported in Table 3 (for rating subcate-
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Figure 4: Implied rating transition probabilities from Baa to A, B and Caa.
One-year probabilities as functions of a (given T = 5) and T (given a = 0.5) derived
from the utility-based method for an implied Baa default probability of 1.5%.
gories in the 18-ratings system, we interpolate the credit spreads). As in JLT and
KK, we let the parameter θ be time-dependent – the risk assessment of a speciﬁc
ﬁrm (or point in time) relative to an average ﬁrm (or time period) is likely to
vary with the time horizon – and adjust each of the one-year (forward) transition
matrices.
5 Results
This section presents the results of our relative pricing analysis. We calibrate the
rating-based model to the market prices of the reference bonds. Subsequently, the
step-up provisions are valued using the derived issuer-speciﬁc default and rating
probabilities. This procedure is repeated for each trading day in our sample. For
Moody’s we use the 18-ratings historical transition matrix for the period 1983-
2001, published in Hamilton, Cantor, and Ou (2002). For S&P we use the matrix
based on the period 1981-2001, published in Standard and Poor’s (2002). We
corrected both matrices for ’withdrawn ratings’. To avoid the unreliable humps
observed in the empirical matrices, we apply the smoothing method described in
Appendix C.
Other factors than credit risk aﬀect the yield spread between corporate bonds
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and government bonds.19 In the U.S. market, tax eﬀects account for a part of the
spread.20 Also, liquidity eﬀects and convenience yields on Treasuries due to repo
specialness are likely to aﬀect the spread.21 The probability of default on AAA
bonds in a short period of time is negligible. Thus, the short yield spread between
AAA and government bonds can be regarded as a measure of the yield spread
caused by other factors than credit risk. We add the spread between the 2-3-
year MSCI AAA Euro corporate bond index and the 2-year German benchmark
government bond (the spread ranging from 12 to 44 bp with an average of 29 bp
in our sample) to the German government bond yield curve to account for these
factors.
To test the stability of our base case results in Section 5.1, Section 5.2 provides
a series of robustness checks. In general, they support the conclusions drawn
from the base case calculations. Finally, in Section 5.3, we investigate the capital
structure implications of our ﬁndings.
5.1 Base case results
For each issuer and on each trading day, we calibrate the rating-based model to
the reference bonds following (10). In doing that we face two practical problems.
First, as mentioned, the universe of reference bonds is small, and we have to
specify a structure between the maturities of the reference bonds. Second, some
of the reference bonds have maturities close to each other which can cause an
erratic term structure of adjustment parameters or even make exact calibration
infeasible. To obtain a smooth structure of adjustment parameters, we use the
following 2-parameter piecewise-linear structure in the base case calculations
θt =


α1 for t = 1, . . . , T1
T2−t
T2−T1α1 +
t−T1
T2−T1α2 for t = T1 + 1, . . . , T2 − 1
α2 for t = T2, . . .
(11)
where T1 and T2 are the maturities of the two earliest reference bonds rounded up
to the next integer.22 That is, in periods with two reference bonds, we calibrate
exactly to these two bonds, and in periods with more than two reference bonds,
we minimize the quadratic price diﬀerences with respect to α1 and α2. We test
two alternative ﬁtting procedures in the robustness checks.
19Huang and Huang (2002) estimate that default risk only account for around 30% of the
spread for Baa-issues.
20Elton et al. (2001) document that a substantial part of the spread (on the order of 30-40
bp) can be explained by corporate bonds being subject to state as well as government taxes in
the U.S.
21Section 2 gave several references to empirical evidence on liquidity eﬀects, and Jordan and
Jordan (1997) document repo specialness eﬀects.
22Rounding down or oﬀ to the closest integer instead gives essentially the same results.
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Figure 5: DT and FT bootstrapped risk-adjustment parameters. α1 (short)
and α2 (long) derived from calibrating the model to reference bond market prices using
(10) and (11), based on S&P ratings and the smoothed S&P transition matrix.
Figure 5 illustrates the risk-adjustment parameters derived for the two com-
panies. The risk-adjustment parameters are volatile in periods with volatile yield
spreads. The size of the parameters is unimportant and can be artiﬁcially scaled
down (up) by increasing (decreasing) the parameter a, essentially without chang-
ing the implied probabilities as we saw in Section 4.2. The risk-adjustment is in
general positive – only negative for long maturities in a few periods of the FT
sample with substantially positive short maturity adjustment – indicating that
default risk is positively priced. Note again that the parameters are not to be
interpreted as relative risk aversions – e.g. a negative 10-year parameter only
means that the market attaches lower default probability to the 10th year than
implied by the empirical rating matrix (given a large upward adjustment of the
short maturity default probabilities). The standard deviation on the reference
bond price errors in the part of the sample with more than two reference bonds
is 0.43 for DT and 0.30 for FT.
The market and model prices of the FT 2008 step-up bond are presented
in the left panel of Figure 6, whereas the values of the step-up provisions are
isolated in the right panel. As in Section 2, we deﬁne the step-up provision value
to be the present value of any future payments in excess of the regular bond cash
ﬂow, where the regular cash ﬂow includes the initially scheduled payments and a
potentially already triggered step-up payment at the next coupon date.23 Hence,
23This deﬁnition corresponds to (2) and (3) excluding the ﬁrst term, which represents the
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Figure 6: FT 2008 step-up bond, market and theoretical values. Theoretical
prices are obtained from calibrating the model to the reference bond market prices using
(10). The theoretical provision value is computed as the possible step-up payments
in excess of the regular cash ﬂow discounted by the state-prices from the calibrated
model. The regular cash ﬂow is deﬁned as the remaining part of the initially scheduled
payments plus a potentially already triggered step-up payment at the next coupon date.
Market value is bond market price minus the theoretical value of the regular cash ﬂow.
the theoretical value of the provisions is positive by deﬁnition. The market value
of the provision is calculated as a residual: the market bond price minus the
theoretical value of the regular cash ﬂow. Therefore small changes in the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc implied default probabilities translate into relatively large changes in the
discounted regular cash ﬂow, and thus in the provision market values. Figures 7
and 8 present similar results for other step-up provisions. The two DT step-up
bonds not illustrated in the graphs follow a pattern similar to the two bonds
in the bottom of Figure 8. The results conﬁrm the ﬁrst assessments made in
Section 2: the market values attached to the provisions are volatile and low –
even negative in parts of the sample. In addition, the market values are almost
throughout the sample less than the model values.
All the base case results are summarized in Table 4. Net present value (NPV)
is deﬁned as theoretical bond price minus market price. The FT provisions have
higher theoretical and market values than the DT provisions due to the structure
of the provisions. The market values correspond reasonably well with the model-
independent ﬁndings reported in Table 2. In most of the sample, the underpricing
is economically signiﬁcant – in some cases more than 2% of face value. At the end
potentially already triggered payment at the upcoming coupon date.
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of the sample, however, most of the NPVs have decreased markedly, and generally
there is no signiﬁcant underpricing. The FT 2008 step-up bond, however, still
trades well below theoretical levels. It is important to note from Figure 7 that
the NPV of the FT 2004 step-up bond collapsed in March 2003. This is not
surprising given that the uncertainty of the cash ﬂow disappears as the step-up
bonds approach the penultimate coupon date (March 14, 2003, for the FT 2004
bond). Apparently, we start to see the same eﬀect for some of the other step-up
bonds.
One might be concerned that liquidity causes pricing diﬀerences between is-
sues of the same issuer. We have however, as mentioned in Section 2, only
included the most liquid bond issues of each issuer. Another worry could be that
a potential credit-cliﬀ – a phenomenon described in the introduction – may cause
diﬀerences in the pricing of ﬁxed-coupon bonds and step-up bonds. The pricing
of step-up bonds is driven by recovery rates, rating probabilities and default prob-
abilities. Fixed-coupon bonds and step-up bonds of the same issuer and priority
must have identical recovery payments and default probabilities, but there could
be a credit-cliﬀ eﬀect on the rating probabilities. It has to be very small, however,
since the potential increase in liabilities is small, especially for DT. In turn, the
impact on the relative pricing between step-up and ﬁxed-coupon bonds has to be
very small since default probabilities are the dominant factor. Furthermore, the
negative step-up provision market values often observed cannot be explained by
any alternative speciﬁcation of rating transition probabilities.
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Figure 7: FT step-up provisions, market and theoretical values. The theoret-
ical value is computed as the possible step-up payments in excess of the regular cash
ﬂow discounted by the state-prices from the calibrated model. The regular cash ﬂow
is deﬁned as the remaining part of the initially scheduled payments plus a potentially
already triggered step-up payment at the next coupon date. Market value is bond
market price minus the theoretical value of the regular cash ﬂow.
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Figure 8: DT step-up provisions, market and theoretical values. The theoret-
ical value is computed as the possible step-up payments in excess of the regular cash
ﬂow, discounted by the state-prices from the calibrated model. The regular cash ﬂow
is deﬁned as the remaining part of the initially scheduled payments plus a potentially
already triggered step-up payment at the next coupon date. Market value is bond
market price minus the theoretical value of the regular cash ﬂow.
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Theoretical value Market value NPV
Sub-sample 2001
DT 6.125% Jul 6 2005 0.43 (0.02) -0.55 (0.21) 0.99 (0.21)
DT 5.875% Jul 11 2006 0.60 (0.02) -1.16 (0.40) 1.76 (0.41)
DT 7.5% May 29 2007 - - -
DT 6.125% Dec 4 2007 - - -
DT 5.75% Feb 12 2008 - - -
DT 6.5% Oct 7 2009 - - -
FT 5.75% Mar 14 2004 0.60 (0.33) 0.23 (0.43) 0.38 (0.17)
FT 5% Feb 26 2005 0.16 (0.00) -0.27 (0.14) 0.42 (0.13)
FT 6.75% Mar 14 2008 2.12 (0.77) -0.17 (1.27) 2.30 (0.59)
Sub-sample 2002
DT 6.125% Jul 6 2005 0.79 (0.26) 0.41 (0.45) 0.39 (0.53)
DT 5.875% Jul 11 2006 1.06 (0.30) -0.24 (0.66) 1.30 (0.70)
DT 7.5% May 29 2007 0.45 (0.02) -0.94 (0.85) 1.39 (0.84)
DT 6.125% Dec 4 2007 0.57 (0.00) -0.88 (0.18) 1.45 (0.18)
DT 5.75% Feb 12 2008 - - -
DT 6.5% Oct 7 2009 0.75 (0.05) -1.59 (0.81) 2.34 (0.79)
FT 5.75% Mar 14 2004 1.11 (0.31) -0.03 (0.69) 1.15 (0.62)
FT 5% Feb 26 2005 0.46 (0.27) -0.74 (0.69) 1.20 (0.63)
FT 6.75% Mar 14 2008 4.64 (1.41) 2.09 (1.88) 2.55 (1.47)
Sub-sample 2003
DT 6.125% Jul 6 2005 0.73 (0.21) 0.74 (0.32) -0.01 (0.31)
DT 5.875% Jul 11 2006 1.13 (0.20) 0.53 (0.51) 0.60 (0.56)
DT 7.5% May 29 2007 0.66 (0.05) -0.23 (0.42) 0.90 (0.44)
DT 6.125% Dec 4 2007 0.77 (0.05) -0.27 (0.55) 1.04 (0.56)
DT 5.75% Feb 12 2008 0.82 (0.03) -0.17 (0.48) 0.99 (0.50)
DT 6.5% Oct 7 2009 1.13 (0.06) -0.04 (1.07) 1.17 (1.06)
FT 5.75% Mar 14 2004 0.35 (0.61) 0.44 (0.53) -0.09 (0.14)
FT 5% Feb 26 2005 0.41 (0.16) 0.35 (0.14) 0.07 (0.18)
FT 6.75% Mar 14 2008 4.97 (0.88) 2.24 (0.73) 2.73 (0.30)
Table 4: Market and theoretical step-up provision values. Average (and stan-
dard deviation) of daily observations. The theoretical value is computed as the possible
step-up payments in excess of the regular cash ﬂow discounted by the state-prices from
the calibrated model. The regular cash ﬂow is deﬁned as the remaining part of the
initially scheduled payments plus a potentially already triggered step-up payment at
the next coupon date. Market value is bond market price minus the theoretical value
of the regular cash ﬂow. NPV is deﬁned as theoretical value minus market value.
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5.2 Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our results, we repeat the calculations with various
alternative assumptions and speciﬁcations. The results of the robustness checks
are found in Table 5. The tables only report the NPVs but the theoretical values
of the step-up provisions are relatively stable across all speciﬁcations, and in
most cases the diﬀerences in NPV mainly stem from diﬀerences in market values
arising from changes in the implied default probabilities.
1. We compare our results with the KK calibration methods described in Section
4.2. From the NPVs, we conclude that the order of underpricing is largely the
same as in the base case. The rest of the robustness checks are performed within
the calibration framework (10).
2. We assumed a 44% recovery of face value (RFV) at default. Table 5 shows
that the results are relatively insensitive to this parameter value – lower recovery
rate means higher implied default probabilities, and the eﬀect on ﬁxed-coupon
and step-up bonds is approximately the same. A lower recovery rate attaches
slightly higher theoretical value to the step-up provisions, due to a higher upward
adjustment of default and downgrade probabilities. As mentioned, the most
realistic recovery assumption approximating legal practise in liquidation is RFV
paid at the time of default. However, absolute strict priority may be violated in
debt renegotiations in which case, as mentioned in Duﬃe and Singleton (1999),
other recovery assumptions may be better approximations. They apply recovery
of market value, whereas e.g. Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and JLT apply recovery
of Treasury (RT). We compare with RT, which is a fractional recovery at the
time of default of an otherwise identical Treasury bond. To do so, we need a
RT rate comparable with 44% RFV. The two types of recovery assumptions are
inequivalent for multiple maturities, but a 50% RT is roughly comparable with
a 44% RFV for our relevant maturities. Relative to RFV, RT attaches slightly
lower value to low coupon bonds trading below par, since they get a less favorable
treatment in default. This is reﬂected in lower NPVs for the two shortest FT
bonds step-up bonds with relatively low coupons. The eﬀect is reversed for the
FT 2008 bond and the DT step-up bonds with relatively high coupon rates, but
overall the eﬀect is small.
3. We introduced a non-default-related spread equal to the yield spread between
a AAA corporate bond index and government bonds. We explore two diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the non-default-related spread. First, we could ignore this issue
and exclude the non-default-related spread. Second, Huang and Huang (2002)
give quantitative guidelines for the non-default-related spread. In line with their
ﬁndings we could, for our relevant rating classes, assume that it accounts for
80% of the spread for maturities up to 4-years and 70% of the spread for matu-
rities longer than 10-year and interpolate the fraction between 4 and 10 years.
The conclusions are robust with respect to the assumption of non-default-related
spreads, and at the same time these tests show that our results are insensitive to
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the choice of default-free benchmark.
4. In the base case we used the smoothed versions of the rating transition matrices
published by the rating agencies. Using the original, unsmoothed matrices does
not change the conclusions.
5. We had to make a simplifying assumption regarding the covariation of the
Moody’s and S&P ratings. In Section 3.2, we assumed that the rating of one
agency adapts to the rating of the other agency with probability A = 80% in each
period. The conclusions are stable to extreme values of A. Looking at subperiods
(not shown), as expected, the provision value is lower for independent ratings
when the provision has not been triggered, and vice versa when the provision has
already been triggered.
6. The issuer-speciﬁc default probabilities derived from the reference bonds are
crucial for assessing the theoretical value of the step-up bonds, since small changes
in the default probabilities translate into changes in the discounted principals that
are relatively large compared to the size of the step-up cash ﬂows. We only have a
small number of reference bonds, and we need to assume a structure between the
them. We address that problem in four ways. First of all, we note that the results
are remarkably general across maturities whether the step-up bond (S) matures
before, between or after the reference bonds (R). The maturity sequences for the
eleven DT bonds and the eight FT bonds are RRSRSRSSSRS and SSRRSRRR,
respectively, and every single step-up bond has been signiﬁcantly underpriced
in most of the sample. Secondly, we observed that the NPV of the FT 2004
step-up bond converged to zero as we approached the penultimate coupon date,
after which it is a standard ﬁxed coupon bond. Importantly, this is not due to
the entrance of a new FT reference bond in the calibration. This provides some
evidence that the discount curves estimated from the FT reference bonds can in
fact be used to value other FT issues, and towards the end of the sample we start
to see the same convergence for other short step-up bonds. Thirdly, we rerun
the computations with a ﬂat risk-adjustment structure between reference bonds.
Formally, as an alternative to (11), we apply
θt =
{
α1 for t = 1, . . . , T1
α2 for t = T1 + 1, . . .
(12)
The results are materially the same. Finally, we do a more conservative test by
measuring each step-up bond against the cheapest of its two neighbors, where the
neighbors are the two reference bonds maturing just before and after the relevant
step-up bond. That is we calibrate the model with a constant θ-structure to the
neighbor with the highest implied default probabilities. We still get underpricing
on sample average, although in many cases of signiﬁcantly smaller degree. In
summary, the results conﬁrm that the selection of reference bonds and the prac-
tical implementation are indeed important. Overall the order of underpricing
has, however, been higher than the uncertainty associated with these practical
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Amount Issued Theoretical Market NPV
m EUR provision value provision value
Step-up bonds:
DT 7.5% May 29 2007 2,500 May 25 2002 0.49 -1.62 2.11
DT 6.125% Dec 4 2007 500 Nov 25 2003 0.57 -0.56 1.13
DT 5.75% Feb 12 2008 1,000 Jan 29 2003 0.85 -2.10 2.95
DT 6.5% Oct 7 2009 500 Sep 27 2002 0.75 -1.90 2.64
FT 5.75% Mar 14 2004 3,500 Mar 7 2001 0.41 -0.13 0.54
FT 5% Feb 26 2005 2,750 Nov 8 2001 0.16 -0.34 0.50
FT 6.75% Mar 14 2008 3,500 Mar 7 2001 1.52 -1.56 3.09
Reference bonds:
DT 5.25% Sep 24 2004 500 Sep 11 2002 -0.47
DT 5.5% Sep 30 2005 500 Sep 19 2002 0.48
DT 5.25% Jan 22 2007 500 Jan 8 2002 0.84
FT 6% Sep 28 2007 1,000 Jan 15 2003 0.84
FT 7% Dec 23 2009 2,000 Dec 12 2002 1.76
FT 7.25% Jan 28 2013 3,000 Jan 15 2003 1.16
Table 6: Pricing at issuance of step-up and reference bonds. The NPV is
theoretical price, obtained from the calibrated model, minus market price.
considerations.
5.3 Capital structure implications
Our ﬁndings suggest the important implication that issuing corporate bonds with
step-up provisions increased the cost of capital for the issuers. To address that,
we need to investigate the pricing at issuance. For each bond issued within our
sample – both step-up and ﬁxed-coupon – we do that by calibrating the rating-
based model under the base case assumptions to all reference bonds issued prior
to the issuance of that speciﬁc bond. Thus, new issues of both reference bonds
and step-up bonds on their date of issuance have theoretical values which deviate
from observed market values. We then look for underpricing by checking if these
deviations are larger for step-up bonds.
Table 6 demonstrates that the step-up bonds were substantially underpriced
at issuance. Remarkably, all step-up provisions have negative market values at
issuance, so the underpricing is independent of how the rating transition probabil-
ities are speciﬁed. To address the cost of capital consequences of issuing step-up
bonds instead of ﬁxed-coupon bonds, we need to compare with the pricing at
issuance of the ﬁxed-coupon reference bonds, which is also reported in Table 6.
For DT, the NPVs at issuance of step-up bonds are signiﬁcantly higher than the
NPVs of the reference bonds. For FT, the evidence is less clear. The FT 2013
ﬁxed-coupon bond is more than two years longer than the longest reference bonds
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used to calculate its NPV, which is therefore very uncertain. The FT 2008 step-
up bond was more underpriced at issuance than the comparable reference bonds
maturing in 2007 and 2009. Apparently the underpricing at issuance of FT 2004
and 2005 was small. This can perhaps be explained by their short maturities
which leave little time for the step-up provisions to take eﬀect. In summary, we
ﬁnd evidence that issuing step-up bonds has increased the cost of capital for DT.
For FT, there is some evidence that issuing the long-term, but not the short-term,
step-up bonds increased the cost of capital.
Besides pricing, the ﬁnancing decision is aﬀected by other factors. In the
classical capital structure theory, optimal debt is chosen as a trade oﬀ between
tax beneﬁts from debt on the one hand and the bankruptcy costs and agency
costs from debt on the other. Bankruptcy costs and tax beneﬁts both favor
ﬁxed-coupon bonds rather than step-up bonds, and actually an opposite coupon-
structure would be more eﬃcient (like in income bonds, as mentioned by Miller (1977)).
In the setting of Leland (1994), Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2003) argue that
the bankruptcy costs of a step-up bond are higher than bankruptcy costs of a
comparable ﬁxed-coupon bond due to the so-called credit-cliﬀ. Furthermore, the
tax beneﬁts are lower since part of the tax shield is postponed and the highest
coupon payments are due in states of nature where the debtor may not be able to
make (full) use of the tax shield. On the other hand, step-up bonds may reduce
the agency costs of debt. The presence of the step-up clauses may reduce the
incentives for asset substitution, since increasing the risk in favor of the equity-
holders may come at the cost of higher coupon payments to the bondholders –
depending on the distribution of the ﬁrm value and the reaction of the rating
agencies. Agency costs are diﬃcult to quantify, but in this case the reduction
in agency costs is uncertain and likely to be small given the modest size of the
step-ups, in particular for DT. Hence, it seems improbable that small, uncertain
reductions in agency costs balances the three arguments against the issuance of
step-up bonds: higher bankruptcy costs, lower tax beneﬁts, and the underpricing
we ﬁnd.
6 Conclusion
We studied the relative pricing of step-up bonds and ﬁxed-coupon bonds in the
rating-based Markov chain model of Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997). Within
this framework, we introduced a new calibration method, which overcomes the
numerical problems with the calibration method of Jarrow, Lando, and Turn-
bull (1997) and the problems in interpreting risk premia inherent in the method
of Kijima and Komoribayashi (1998). Additionally, we proposed simple ways of
accounting for split ratings and rating outlook.
We ﬁnd that step-up bonds issued by the two most active step-up bond issuers,
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom, have been underpriced through most
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of the sample. The conclusion is supported by model-independent yield curve
observations, a calibrated rating-based model and a number of robustness checks.
Because of maturity and coupon diﬀerences between the various issues, there were
no direct static arbitrage opportunities. However, the rating-based model shows
that the average underpricing was substantial – as much as 2% of face value on
sample average in some cases. At the end of our sample, however, there is no
clear evidence of underpricing.
Our ﬁndings cannot be attributed to traditional liquidity measures, but one
might speculate that the complexity of the step-up provisions is what causes
markets to discount these bonds. Complicated and non-standard assets may
be priced with a discount irrespective of traditional liquidity measures. Step-
up bonds are relatively simple assets but they require estimates of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
rating probabilities, and in many cases they are unnecessarily complicated by
path-dependence. Moreover, the stochastic cash ﬂow is inconvenient for many
investors focused on yields and yield spreads, and the precise language of the
step-up provisions varies across issues resulting in a non-standardized market
and making it diﬃcult to compare diﬀerent issues. This point has also been
mentioned in several investment bank notes.24
These considerations are consistent with incomplete information stories in the
asset pricing literature. Firstly, in a model with diﬀerential information across
securities, Barry and Brown (1985) show that securities with more uncertainty to
the return parameters can have higher expected returns in equilibrium. The re-
turn on a step-up bond is subject to rating transition risk, in addition to interest
rate and default risk, and may therefore have higher estimation risk – the cash
ﬂow of a step-up bond depends explicitly on credit ratings, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc rat-
ing transitions probabilities can be hard to estimate. Secondly, in an incomplete
24E.g.: ”The ensuing market confusion about pricing BT bonds with diﬀerent coupon fre-
quencies has once again highlighted the complexity of step-up bonds’ valuation and called into
question the usefulness of step-ups as an investor protection tool ... the task of diﬀerentiating
bonds with various covenant packages has become increasingly complicated with virtually every
new jumbo oﬀering, because they all tend to devise variations on the step-up theme” Credit
Suisse First Boston, Telecom Bonds with Coupon Step-Ups (May 30, 2001), and ”Although
coupon step-up bonds can provide some downside protection for investors, the beneﬁts are
partially undermined by the diﬃculties involved in accurately assessing the worth of step-ups.
Since the telecom sector began issuing step-up bonds last summer, there has been a lot of
confusion regarding the true worth of the step-up feature and debates regarding the beneﬁts
for bondholders. While most investors like the downside protection oﬀered by these bonds,
many analysts question the right way to value the step-ups” J.P. Morgan, European Telecoms
Update (June 7, 2001), and ”... investors and analysts have become aware that even though
step-ups provide some downside protection in periods of uncertainty, they also create diﬃculties
in correctly assessing relative value and comparisons between bonds. This is contrary to the
idea of having a standardised bond language, necessary for a liquid market. Importantly, it
adds an element of uncertainty to credit analysis, as investors have to rely increasingly on sub-
jective decisions by rating agencies, causing some frustration” J.P. Morgan, European Telecoms
Handbook (January 17, 2002).
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information model where investors only invest in securities about which they have
enough information, Merton (1987) shows that the securities with limited par-
ticipation have higher equilibrium expected returns.25 In the present case, some
investors may choose to ignore step-up bonds due to information or setup costs.
The fact that the underpricing becomes less signiﬁcant towards the end of the
sample also supports both of these explanations. As the step-up bonds approach
maturity, the uncertainty of the cash ﬂow, and therefore parameter uncertainty,
decreases. Also, as time goes by, the knowledge about and participation in these
securities may have increased.
Whatever the explanation for the underpricing, our results raise the question
why ﬁrms issue step-up bonds in the ﬁrst place. Apparently, the step-up provi-
sions are trading below theoretical values, suggesting that they actually increase
the cost of capital for the issuers. This is important since the step-up bonds
account for almost a quarter of total liabilities for the two companies we studied.
25As one example, Merton gives: ”... a bond trader who responds quickly to interest rate
news by trading U.S. Treasury bonds, may not be willing to trade GNMA mortgage-backed
bonds unless he has borne the set-up costs necessary to understand the eﬀect on price of the
prepayment feature of these bonds.” Merton (1987, p. 489).
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Appendix A: Rating actions
DT FT
Date Moody’s S&P Moody’s S&P
as of Jan 1, 2000 Aa2 (-2) AA- (0) Aa2 (0) AA (-2)
Apr 10 2000 Aa2 (-1)
Apr 28 2000 AA- (-2) AA- (0)
May 30 2000 Aa2 (-2) AA- (-2)
Jun 22 2000 Aa2 (-2)
Aug 23 2000 A (0)
Sep 18 2000 A1 (0)
Oct 5 2000 A2 (0)
Oct 6 2000 A- (0)
Feb 12 2001 A2 (-1)
Feb 15 2001 A3 (0)
Feb 16 2001 A- (-1)
Feb 26 2001 A- (-2)
Mar 20 2001 A2 (-2)
Jun 11 2001 A- (-1)
Jun 13 2001 A3 (-1)
Aug 13 2001 A3 (-1)
Sep 6 2001 A3 (-2) A- (-2)
Sep 25 2001 BBB+ (-1)
Sep 26 2001 Baa1 (0)
Feb 1 2002 Baa1 (-1)
Feb 25 2002 A3 (-2)
Feb 26 2002 A- (-2)
Mar 27 2002 Baa1 (-2)
Mar 28 2002 Baa1 (0) BBB+ (-2)
Apr 8 2002 BBB+ (0)
May 23 2002 Baa1 (-1)
Jun 24 2002 Baa3 (-1)
Jun 25 2002 BBB (-1)
Jul 12 2002 BBB- (0)
Sep 13 2002 Baa3 (0)
Nov 18 2002 Baa1 (-2)
Jan 10 2003 Baa3 (0)
Mar 24 2003 BBB- (+2)
May 14 2003 BBB (0)
Jun 24 2003 Baa3 (+1)
Sep 22 2003 Baa3 (+1)
Table 7: Rating actions for DT and FT. The ratings are for senior unsecured in the
period from January 1, 2000, to October 7, 2003. Rating outlook for Moody’s/S&P
in parentheses: 0 (stable/stable), -1 (negative outlook/negative outlook), -2 (review
for possible downgrade/negative watch), +1 (positive outlook/positive outlook), +2
(review for possible upgrade/positive watch). Source: Moody’s and S&P.
37
Appendix B: Path-dependent step-up provisions
This appendix gives the details of the step-up provision value in the path-dependent
case, (3), of Section 3.1.
Let the set of possible step-up amounts for a given step-up bond be denoted
by U . Hence the expected value in (3) can be expressed as
S(i,j)(t, tm) = f(ut−1 , η
M
t0
, ηSt0)B(t, t1)Qt(τ > t1)
+
K−1∑
k=1
K−1∑
l=1
f(ut0 , k, l)B(t, t2)Qt(η
M
t1
= k, ηSt1 = l)
·Q(τ > t2 | ηMt1 = k, ηSt1 = l)
+
m∑
n=3
K−1∑
k=1
K−1∑
l=1
∑
u∈U
f(u, k, l)B(t, tn)Qt(utn−2 = u, η
M
tn−1 = k, η
S
tn−1 = l)
·Q(τ > tn | ηMtn−1 = k, ηStn−1 = l)
The terms involving the 3-dimensional Markov process are given by
Qt(utn−1 = u, η
M
tn = k, η
S
tn = l) =
K−1∑
k¯=1
K−1∑
l¯=1
∑
u¯∈U
Qt(utn−2 = u¯, η
M
tn−1 = k¯, η
S
tn−1 = l¯)
·Q(utn−1 = u, ηMtn = k, ηStn = l | utn−2 = u¯, ηMtn−1 = k¯, ηStn−1 = l¯)
where
Q(utn−1 = u, η
M
tn = k, η
S
tn = l | utn−2 = u¯, ηMtn−1 = k¯, ηStn−1 = l¯)
=
{
Q(ηMtn = k, η
S
tn = l | ηMtn−1 = k¯, ηStn−1 = l¯) if u = f(u¯, k¯, l¯)
0 if u = f(u¯, k¯, l¯)
with the function f deﬁned by the speciﬁc provision. The four DT provisions are
deﬁned with U = {0, 0.005} and
f(u, k, l) = u1{max{k,l}≥8} + (0.005− u)1{min{k,l}≥8}
The provision of the FT 2005 bond is deﬁned with U = {0, 0.002, 0.004, ..., 0.002(K−
9)} and
f(u, k, l) =
{
0.002 [min{k, l} − 8]+ for min{k, l} ≥ R
0.002 [min{R,max{k, l}} − 8]+ for min{k, l} < R
with R = u
0.002
+ 8 being the rating level at which step-up was triggered at the
previous coupon date. Note, if k = l this simpliﬁes to f(u, k, l) = 0.002[k − 8]+.
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Appendix C: Smoothing the transition matrix
In this appendix we construct an idealized rating transition matrix P˜ by smooth-
ing the empirical rating matrix P . This serves to remove unreliable humps in the
empirical matrix, and another merit is strictly positive entries (in the ﬁrst K − 1
rows) which turn out to be convenient in applying the multiplicative adjustments
proposed in Section 4.
It seems natural to require that the rating migration probability is non-
increasing in the size of the migration, measured by the number of rating notches.
An exception, however, is the default event which may well be more likely than a
downgrade to some of the lower non-default categories. Therefore, given an initial
rating i ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1 }, we will require that p˜ij ≥ p˜ik for i ≤ j ≤ k ≤ K − 1
and p˜ij ≤ p˜ik for 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ i. Additionally and more importantly, we will
require that the default probability is higher the lower the initial credit quality,
i.e. p˜iK ≤ p˜jK for i ≤ j ≤ K. It could also be argued, that the probability of
being upgraded to a given rating j should be non-decreasing in the initial credit
quality, and vice versa below the diagonal. This property, however, is far from
being fulﬁlled by the empirical matrices, in particular for lower rating categories,
and imposing this restriction to P˜ would require severe adjustments of the em-
pirical matrix. Hence, it will not be imposed in this approach, but it turns out
that the extent of violations to this restriction is signiﬁcantly reduced by the
other restrictions imposed. We refer to Kijima (1998) for more on monotonicity
of transition matrices.
In order to preserve some basic structure of the empirical matrix and to re-
ﬂect the notion that rare events are estimated with the highest uncertainty the
following restrictions are imposed on the smoothing method:
(i) Given any initial rating, the probability of unchanged rating is preserved,
i.e. p˜ii = pii for i = 1, . . . , K − 1.
(ii) Given any initial rating, the probability of a downgrade (including default)
is preserved, i.e.
∑K
j=i+1 p˜ij =
∑K
j=i+1 pij for i = 1, . . . , K − 1.
(iii) Given any initial rating, the probability of upgrade is preserved,
i.e.
∑i−1
j=1 p˜ij =
∑i−1
j=1 pij for i = 2, . . . , K − 1.
(iv) The sum of default probabilities is preserved, i.e.
∑K
i=1 p˜iK =
∑K
i=1 piK .
The last property ensures that a portfolio consisting of a number of bonds evenly
distributed among the K − 1 rating categories has the same expected number of
one-period defaults using P˜ , as using P .
In general, all rows of the empirical rating matrix seem to follow a pattern
of exponential decline away from the diagonal (excluding the default column).
Hence, the entries of P˜ should be well approximated by an expression of the
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Moody’s historical smoothed S&P historical smoothed
Aaa 0 1.8E-05 AAA 0 2.3E-05
Aa1 0 3.3E-05 AA+ 0 4.2E-05
Aa2 0 0.0001 AA 0 0.0001
Aa3 0.0008 0.0001 AA- 0.0003 0.0001
A1 0 0.0002 A+ 0.0006 0.0002
A2 0.0002 0.0004 A 0.0004 0.0004
A3 0 0.0007 A- 0.0005 0.0008
Baa1 0.0008 0.0012 BBB+ 0.0019 0.0014
Baa2 0.0007 0.0022 BBB 0.0031 0.0024
Baa3 0.0046 0.0039 BBB- 0.0035 0.0043
Ba1 0.0068 0.0071 BB+ 0.0052 0.0078
Ba2 0.0072 0.0129 BB 0.0117 0.0139
Ba3 0.0249 0.0234 BB- 0.0193 0.0248
B1 0.0404 0.0424 B+ 0.0361 0.0444
B2 0.0875 0.0770 B 0.1040 0.0793
B3 0.1372 0.1397 B- 0.1351 0.1417
Caa 0.2960 0.2960 CCC 0.2826 0.2826
Table 8: One-year default frequencies, historical and smoothed. Source:
Moody’s 1983-2001 (Hamilton, Cantor, and Ou (2002)) and S&P 1981-2001 (Standard
and Poor’s (2002)).
type νe−µk, where k represents the horizontal distance to the diagonal in terms
of rating notches. Similarly, the default column is represented by a vertically in-
creasing exponential function. This structure ensures the desired monotonicities.
P˜ is obtained by minimizing the quadratic deviations from the empirical matrix
P subject to the above mentioned restrictions, i.e. by ﬁtting the parameters
(µ, ν) in the default column and in each row on either side of the diagonal.
Table 8 presents the default column of the historical Moody’s and S&P
transition matrices (from Hamilton, Cantor, and Ou (2002) and Standard and
Poor’s (2002), respectively) as well as the smoothed versions. We do not show the
entire matrices, but there is no sign of a systematic pattern of the modiﬁcations
from the original to the smoothed matrix at the boundary between investment
grade and speculative grade (between Baa3/BBB- and Ba1/BB+) or anywhere
else, which would have indicated a problem with ﬁtting the equidistant exponen-
tial functions. The equidistant exponential functions are admittedly subjective,
but serves as a simple way of obtaining a more reliable rating matrix.
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